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SOME FORMS AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A WAGE EARNERS' INVESTMENT FUND
Preface
The present report is an attempt to describe as simply as
possible some important forms and effects of a wage earners' in-
vestment fund. No attempt has been made to describe, let alone
discuss, ethico-philosophical justifications of such a fund
such a discussion would fall outside the province of scientific
inquiry.
The perusal of the report itself, unlike some of its
references, requires skills in neither advanced economic theory
nor mathematics. Intuitive verbal reasoning may carry the
analysis quite far in some directions and has been used whereever
possible. Where only mathematical analysis and computer simul-
ation will cut through, the report reproduces graphically a few
results of such work published elsewhere by the writer.
Urbana, 111. Hans Brems
Labor Day, 1974
/
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SOME FORMS AND ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF A WAGE EARNERS'
INVESTMENT FUND
By Hans Brems
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
I. THE FORMS
1
. The General Idea
Serving the dual purpose of giving labor a share of, first,
the capital gains accruing to stockholders in an inflationary
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economy and, second, the co-determination rights inherent
in stock ownership, a wage earners' investment fund would work
like this. Preferably in the form of corporate stock employers
would contribute a fraction of either their wage bill, their
profits bill, or their equity. We shall call the three forms
an investment wage, profit sharing, and equity sharing, respect-
ively. The fund would belong to the employees and would issue
nonnegotiable fund certificates to them. The fund certificates
might be shared equally or might be distributed in proportion
to the wage income of the individual employee. A specified
number of years after its issue a fund certificate would become
redeemable in cash at a price which would include the share of
that certificate in the original contribution to the fund and
all capital gains and dividends made on that contribution during
the lifetime of the certificate. In principle at least, the
fund would be allowed to sell contributed corporate stock at
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any time and buy other stock.
Three important choices to be made are, first, among an
investment wage, profit sharing, or equity sharing; second,
between a voluntary or a compulsory scheme; and, third, between
a centralized or a decentralized fund. Let us briefly consider
the three choices.
2# Investment Wage
, Profit Sharing , or Equity Sharing
The opportunities for escaping a compulsory scheme differ
among the three alternatives. The wage bill is something object'
ive, and escape is virtually impossible. The profits bill is
less objective, and profit sharing offers an inducement to
excessive depreciation and to a distortion of the financial
structure of the firm: If profits are defined simply as profits
after interest the firm is induced to substitute borrowed
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capital for equity capital. Such a temptation can be eliminated
by sharing merely profits after interest on borrowed as_ well as
equity capital. Equity sharing, too, induces the firm to minim-
ize equity. The remainder of the present report will divide its
attention equally between the investment wage and profit sharing.
3
.
A Voluntary or a_ Compulsory Scheme
A wage earners' investment fund might result from an agree-
ment between an employer and his employees. No statute would be
required. But the government might induce the parties to con-
clude such agreements by offering them subsidies or tax relief
in proportion to the contributions.
Under voluntary profit sharing within the firm ("betriebliche
Ertragsbeteiligung" ) the employees of the firm are given a share
of the profits of the firm, hence may develop an interest mani-
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festing itself in higher labor productivity.
Under compulsory national profit sharing ( "uberbetriebliche
Ertragsbeteiligung'' ) the employees of all firms receive a share
of the pooled profits of all or at least all the largest
firms in the economy. An interest manifesting itself in higher
labor productivity is hardly to be expected from such pooling.
What can be expected is, perhaps, more labor tolerance of
profit making, Lundberg [31], 30, or of government incomes
policy, Det jikonomiske Rad [113 » 18.
The remainder of the present report will confine itself
to compulsory schemes.
**• A Centralized or a_ Decentralized Fund
To a centralized fund noncorporate firms would contribute
cash, and corporate firms would contribute stock. The cash would
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be placed in other stock. Sale of stock would be necessary to
finance redemption. In principle the fund would be allowed
to sell contributed or acquired corporate stock at any time
and buy other stock. Return maximization would require full
freedom to do so. Obviously the fund would have enough work
to do.
Alternatively, investment could be decentralized. The
individual employee could be free to choose between a fund,
or a number of funds, on the one hand, and more traditional
placement on the other, e. g. , accounts in savings banks or
banks, own-home construction, etc.
The remainder of the present report will primarily
visualize centralized investment.
As illustrations of these principles, let us now survey
very briefly some existing and proposed schemes in four
European Community countries .
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II. FOUR COUNTRIES
1. Federal Republic of Germany
Germany has long experience with, first, nonfunded, voluntary
profit sharing within the firm, e. g. , at Siemens and Farbwerke
Hochst , and, second, a funded, voluntary investment-wage scheme
enacted in 1951 [37], 111-136. The latter was revised twice and
is now so appealing that two-thirds of German wage earners are
participating. Contributions may take the form of stock, bonds,
or cash as agreed, may be agreed upon within a maximum of 624 DM
per annum, and are generously supplemented by government cash
subsidies, i. e. 30% or, if the employee has more than two child-
ren, 40%. The redemption period is 7 years. With the employer's
consent the contributions may be placed in stocks or bonds issued
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by the employing firm, but there are extra inducements to place
them in blocked accounts in savings banks or banks, or to use
them to finance own-home construction.
So much for the experience. Now for the proposals. Compuls-
ory profit sharing was first proposed by Gleitze [24-3 in 1957.
Employers should never be deprived of the use of capital, he
said. Hence, in the form of corporate stock or bonds rather than
in the form of cash, employers should contribute compulsorily a
fraction of their profits bill to the fund. Later German labor
thinking, beginning with Biittner [9] moved away from contrib-
utions in the form of bonds: If free to choose, a firm whose
internal rate of return were greater than the bond rate would
choose to contribute bonds; a firm whose internal rate of return
were less than the bond rate would choose to contribute stock.
Thus the fund would find its portfolio composed of first-
rate bonds but second-rate stock. Moreover, one of the
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purposes of a wage earners 9 investment fund was to give labor
a share of the capital gains accruing to firms under inflation,
and no such gains are made on bonds. The fund should issue
nonnegotiable fund certificates to all employees. At invalidity,
retirement, or a specified number of years after its issue a
fund certificate should become redeemable in cash. In 1961 the
Gleitze Plan was endorsed by Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German
federation of labor unions) [18] but only after two significant
modifications, i. e., first, that contributions should be in
the form of stock, not bonds, second, that fund certificates
should be redeemable at any time. The former modification
remains, the latter has since been abandoned by German labor.
In 1974 the German coalition government published the
principles [21] of a bill proposing compulsory profit sharing.
Contributions were to be in the form of corporate stock or,
subject to a penalty, cash. Smaller firms were exempt. The
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contribution fraction was to be progressive, reaching a maximum
of 10%, The redemption period was to be 7 years the same as
that of the existing investment-wage scheme. An actual bill
was not put before parliament, and the matter was declared to
be a dormant one by the subsequent Schmidt cabinet.
2 . France
A compulsory profit-sharing scheme was enacted by France
in 1967 [37], 79-80 and 92-95. All corporations with more than
100 employees must contribute a fraction of their profits after
interest on borrowed as well as equity capital. Contributions
may take the form of stock, bonds, or cash as agreed. The
redemption period is 5 years. Contributions may be placed in
stocks or bonds issued by the employing firm, in blocked accounts
in savings banks or banks, or in wage earners' investment funds
investing in the stock market. French individualism rears
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its head: Employee shares are not equal but are distributed in
proportion to the wage income of the individual employee.
Although the French scheme is compulsory it enjoys generous
subsidization: All contributions entitle the firm to an exactly
equivalent tax relief.
France has a not insignificant nationalized sector. Inher-
ently a nationalized firm issues no stock, but for the sake of
the wage earners' investment funds 1973 legislation has created such
stock.
3. Denmark
In 1973 a bill proposing a compulsory investment wage failed
to pass in the Danish parliament. The bill, Arbe jdsministeriet
[1] was a modified union proposal, Landsorgan is at ion en [30], Both
proposed a large central fund and a contribution fraction of 5%.

- 12 -
Two-thirds of the contribution by corporations had to be own
stock subject to the rule that at no time could the fund own
more than one-half of the total stock of a corporation. The
bill proposed a redemption period of seven years, whereas the
unions had proposed five years.
4. Britain
With the purpose of paring down consumer demand to wartime
output of consumers* goods, Keynes proposed, in How to Pay for
the War [27] a "deferred-pay" scheme calling for £550 million
in annual compulsory saving. The complete scheme, including
"the accumulation of working-class wealth under working-class
control," would embody, Keynes said in his preface, "an advance
towards economic equality greater than any which we have made
in recent times." Keynes* proposal was adopted strictly as a
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wartime measure and to less than a quarter of his suggested
sum, Maital [33], 166.
After almost 30 years of silence a wage earners' invest-
ment fund was again proposed in Britain in 1973, this time
by the British labor party. The proposal followed the Danish
bill of the same year: Compulsion, the large central fund,
the seven-year redemption period, all employees receiving
equal shares. But there were two differences. First, the
contribution would be in the form of equity sharing rather
than an investment wage. The second difference follows from
the first one. Nationalized firms do have a wage bill but
do not issue stock, hence were exempt from the British proposal.
The French idea of creating stock in nationalized firms was
rejected as a first step toward denationalization.
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III. MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS
1
.
Macroeconomics
Typical macroeconomic theory visualizes a weirdly sim-
plified world: Capitalist-entrepreneurs produce a single
good from labor and a capital stock of that good, hence in-
vestment is the act of setting aside part of output for
installation as capital stock. Capital stock is the result
of accumulated savings.
A macroeconomic model, then, can have only one income
distribution in it, i. e., between labor and capitalist
-entrepreneurs, and only one resource allocation in it,
i. e., between consumption and investment. The model can
illuminate the effects of a wage earners' investment fund
upon the income distribution between labor and capitalist
-entrepreneurs and upon resource allocation between con-
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sumption and investment. This much it can do and no more.
For the moment, however, that is all we want.
2
. The Generation of the Fund
In the form of corporate stock let all employers contribute
compulsorily either a fraction of their wage bill or of their
profits bill to a wage earners' investment fund. The fund will
be growing for two reasons. First, what is being put into it
is growing: The wage bill or the profits bill themselves are
growing. Second, once put in, the contributions will be put
to good use and earn a return in the form of capital gains
and dividends. Let such earnings of the fund be compounded,
and let all wage earners present their fund certificates for
redemption as soon as the latter become redeemable. Redemp-
tion at a certain time is then the original contribution to
the fund and all capital gains and dividends made on that con-
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tribution during the redemption period.
3 * Wa ge Earners * Disposable Income
Define the wage bill as including the employers' contrib-
ution to the fund in the form of an investment wage. Under the
latter, then, we define labor's disposable income at any time as
the wage bill minus contribution plus redemption at that time.
So at any time there is a reduction by the contribution
and an enlargement by the redemption. Which is the larger,
the reduction or the enlargement? Well, what is being redeemed
is the contribution made p years ago, where p is the redemption
period, plus all capital gains and dividends made made on
that contribution during those p years. Because the wage
bill is growing, the contribution made p years ago was
smaller than the current contribution. But under
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realistic growth, the capital gains and dividends made during
those p years will more than make up for the original small-
ness. Consequently, after p years the sum of the original
contribution to the fund and all capital gains and dividends
made on that contribution during the p years will exceed the
current contribution. As a result, labor's disposable income
is larger than it would have been in the absence of a wage
earners' investment fund.
This holds even more under profit sharing where we define
labor's disposable income as merely wage bill plus redemption.
There is no reduction here, only enlargement!
U. Capitalist-Entrepreneurs ' Disposable Income
Let us follow convention and exclude capital gains from
the disposable income of capitalist-entrepreneurs. Under an
investment wage their disposable income is, then, their profits
on all capital stock except the fund. So a wage earners' in-
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vestment fund reduces their disposable income by the profits
they used to make on the capital stock that now belongs to the
fund. There can be no doubt, then, that the disposable income
of capitalist-entrepreneurs is smaller than it would have been
in the absence of a wage earners' investment fund.
This holds even more under profit sharing. Here we define
the disposable income of capitalist-entrepreneurs as their
profits on all capital stock except the fund minus their con-
tribution to the fund. There is a further reduction here and
still no enlargement!
^ National Disposable Income
Until now everything has been straightforward: A wage
earners' investment fund raises labor 'sdisposable income and
lowers that of capitalist-entrepreneurs. But what will it do to
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national disposable income? Will the enlargement be greater
than, equal to, or less than the reductions? The enlargement
is always the redemption. The reductions are, first, the
profits the capitalist-entrepreneurs used to make on the
capital stock that now belongs to the fund and, second, the
contribution to the fund either in the form of the investment
wage or in the form of profit sharing.
Whether the enlargement will be greater than, equal to,
or less than the reductions is not intuitively evident.
Where intuition fails, one must build numerical models and
try to make their structure as realistic as possible. Within
such a realistic framework computer simulation may then give
the answer.
6. Computer Simulation
By computer the present writer has simulated the invest-
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ment wage [7] as well as profit sharing [6]. Both were
examined within the framework of a one-good neoclassical
steady-state growth model [5], Ch. 5, with immortal capital
stock in a Cobb-Douglas production function, assuming a labor
exponent of 3/4, a capital-stock exponent of 1/4, a propens-
ity to consume national disposable real income of 7/8, a zero
growth rate of the labor force, and a technological progress
of 3% per annum. In the absence of a wage earners' investment
fund such a growth model generates the plausible results that
physical output and capital stock are both growing at 4% per
annum, and that the rate of return to capital exclusive of
capital gains is 8% per annum. When a wage earners' invest-
ment fund was put into the model, it generated the effects
upon steady-state disposable income shown in Figures 1 and
2.
Figures 1 and 2 show the effects of an investment wage
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constituting the fraction a_ of the wage bill and profit sharing
constituting the fraction b of the profits bill, respectively,
both having a redemption period of p. By the payout ratio 6
is meant national disposable income as a fraction of national
output. The payout ratios 0, and 9~ are the disposable in-
comes of labor and capitalist-entrepreneurs, respectively, also
measured as fractions of national output. By definition, 8 =
e i
+ V
The results of Figures 1 and 2 read as follows. Both the
investment wage and profit sharing xjill reduce the capitalist
-entrepreneurs' payout ratio and raise labor's payout ratio
as our straightforward intuition suggested. What we could
not see intuitively is that labor wins slightly less than
the capitalist-entrepreneurs are losing, so the overall payout
ratio is down.
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7
. Two Questions
The latter result is all the more remarkable if we raise
<
two questions about the disposable-income definitions used
until now: Under less extreme definitions the overall payout
ratio is down even more!
Our first question is this. Will all wage earners
actually present their fund certificates for redemption as
soon as the latter become redeemable? British experience with
voluntary, nonfunded profit sharing suggests a certain im-
patience: To its employees Imperial Chemical Industries
issues shares annually as a bonus, but half the employees
sell their shares immediately. When Courtaulds tried a similar
bonus even more did, and the scheme was abandoned [40], 74.
German experience with a voluntary, funded investment wage
suggests less impatience, but experience with voluntary schemes
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may be only remotely indicative of behavior under compulsorv
ones, as pointed out by Robinson [37], 126-127. As for com-
pulsory schemes, some impatience is evident in labor-union
attitudes to the length of the redemption period under pro-
posed schemes: A redemption period of zero assured labor-union
endorsement of the Gleitze Plan in 1961. A redemption period
of 5 years was proposed by Danish unions but was lengthened
to 7 years in the Danish bill.
Keynes questioned the assumption that all wage earners
present their fund certificates for redemption as soon as
the latter become redeemable: "It may be," he said, "that
the blocked deposits will be instrumental in spreading the
habit of small savings more widely." [27], 47.
The second question arising in connection with our
disposable-income definitions has to do with capital gain^
.
Such gains were excluded from the disposable income of
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capitalist-entrepreneurs an exclusion well founded in
2
convention . But redemption of a fund certificate was defined
as including the share of that certificate in the original
contribution to the fund and all capital gains and dividends
made on that contribution during the lifetime of the certif-
icate. Redemption thus defined was a component part of wage
earners' disposable income. May such inclusion be justified
by the fund*s indirectness and remoteness? Or may it not be?
May the inclusion of the original contribution and the capital
gains made on it overstate disposable labor income as conceived
by labor itself?
What can be safely said is this. Wage earners can redeem
after but never before the expiration of the redemption period.
Of the original contribution and the capital gains made on it,
wage earners could consider as disposable income less but never
more than 100%. Consequently, our disposable-income definitions
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are bound to understate the thriftiness of wage earners. The
wage earners might well be more reluctant to redeem and more
reluctant to spend what is redeemed. In conclusion, with less
extreme definitions of disposable income, labor's as well as
the overall payout ratio would be even lower than apparent
from our computer simulation.
8. Investment Wage Versus Profit Sharing
Does an investment wage have the same redistributive
effect as profit sharing? Let us compare Figures 1 and 2.
The investment wage was the fraction a_ of the wage bill,
and in the top half of Figure 1, a goes from 1/80 to 1/10.
Profit sharing was the fraction b of the profits bill, and
in the top half of Figure 2, b goes from 1/40 to 1/5. Merely
comparing the diagrams we are left with the impression that
the investment wage has a weaker redistributive effect than
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has profit sharing.
But the diagrams don't tell the whole story. As we know,
the wage bill is much larger than the profits bill. Indeed,
our computer simulation realistically assumed it to be three
times larger: The wage bill was 3/4 and the profits bill
1/4 of national output. Consequently, an investment wage
equalling, say, 1/10 of the wage bill equals 1/10 * 3/4 =
3/40 of national output. And profit sharing equalling, say,
1/5 of the profits bill equals 1/5 x i/n. s 1/20 of national
output. The investment wage, then, is one-and-a-half times
larger than profit sharing, yet as the visual comparison
between Figures 1 and 2 showed has a weaker redistributive
effect. Why should this be?
The explanation is not difficult to find. To be true,
whether in the form of an investment wage or in the form of
profit sharing, contributions are collected from the employer.
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But under the full-employment policies prevailing in countries
considering a wage earners' investment fund, the investment wage
wage can be shifted to the price of goods, while profit
sharing cannot. This is seen as fellows.
The investment wage is a fraction of the wage bill,
consequently a man not hired will cost the firm no investment
wage. Let there be pure competition. Let the money wage rate
be raised by the amount of the investment wage per man year.
Only if this raises the price of goods in the same proportion
can the money wage rate remain equal to the value of the
marginal productivity of labor at full employment. Thus the
investment wage must be shifted to the price of goods under
3pure competition . A very similar argument would hold under
monopoly, oligopoly, or monopolistic competition.
No such shifting could occur under profit sharing. Here 9
let profit sharing be the fraction b of the profits bill. Then
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by manipulating employment, employers are maximizing profits
after contribution to the fund but before dividends, i. e.,
are maximizing the fraction 1 - b of the profits bill. But
the same employment which maximizes the profits bill itself
will maximize the fraction 1 - b of it.
So much for the redistributive effects of a wage earners'
investment fund. Now for its effect upon saving.
9 * Saving : Same Propensities to Consume Disposable Real
Income
Let us begin with the simplest alternative, i. e., thai:
the propensity to consume disposable real income is unaffected
by the introduction of the wage earners* investment fund and is
the same for wage earners and capitalist-enti-,epreneurs . Sinco
as we just saw a wage earners' investment fund will
reduce the national disposable-income fraction of national
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output, it will unequivocally raise the propensity to save
national output .
The results of our computer simulation [6] and [7],
shown in Figures 3 and 4 , bear this out. Figure 3 shows
the effects of an investment wage upon the steady-state
propensity to save national output, called v. Figure 4
shows the effects of profit sharing. In both diagrams the
positive effect upon the propensity v is unmistakable.
10. Different Propensities to Consume Disposable Real Income
Now let us examine a less simple alternative. If the
propensity to consume disposable real income is not the sane
for wage earners and capitalist-entrepreneurs the propensity
to save national output may fall.
As we saw, both an investment wage and profit sharing
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ultimately redistribute disposable income in favor of the
wage earners. Consequently, if wage earners have a substant-
ially higher propensity to consume disposable real income
than do capitalist-entrepreneurs, then redistributing
disposable income from capitalist-entrepreneurs to wage
earners may conceivably overwhelm the effects of reducing
the national disposable-income fraction of national output,
and the net effect may be a fall in the propensity to save
national output. Such a fall is less likely to result under
an investment wage with its weaker redistributive effect
than under profit sharing.
So the propensity to save national output may rise, or
it may fall. We cannot settle the issue on a_ priori grounds
Opposing forces, the relative strengths of which are not
sufficiently known , are at work here. On the one hand, the
disposable-income definitions used in our computer simulation
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represent extremes. Wage earners can redeem after but never
before the expiration of the redemption period. Of the
original contribution and the capital gains made on it,
wage earners could consider as disposable income less but never
more than 100%. Consequently our definitions are bound to
understate the thriftiness of wage earners. On the other
hand, assuming the propensity to consume disposable real
income to be the same for wage earners and capitalist
-entrepreneurs is bound to overstate the thriftiness of
wage earners.
11. Hacroeconomic Conclusions
Our tentative conclusions so far must be the following.
First, a wage earners' investment fund would reduce the
national disposable-income fraction of national output.
Second, it would redistribute disposable income in labor's
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favor. Third, the investment wage would have a weaker
redistributive effect than would profit sharing. The reason
is that the former could be shifted to the price of goods
while the latter could not. Fourth, the fund might raise
the propensity to save national output. An investment wage
with its weaker redistributive effect would be more likely
to do so than would profit sharing.
IV. MICROECONOMIC EFFECTS
!• Microeconomics
A macroeconomic model had only one resource allocation
in it, i. e., the allocation between consumption and invest-
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ment . The simple reason was that it was a one-good model.
The real world is not a one-good economy and therefore
poses an additional and far larger resource-allocation
problem, i. e., how is capital allocated among industries?
It will take multi-industry theory, microeconomic theory,
to answer such a question. We cannot go too far in that
direction, but let us at least consider the role played
by the capital market in such an allocation. Once that role
is understood, we may see how it is modified by the emergence
of a wage earners' investment fund as a major stockholder.
It is always nice to bear in mind the numerical order
of magnitude of things discussed. Therefore, our Appendix
I has assembled a few facts about the corporation and its
life nerve, the stock certificate, in the economy.
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2 ' what Does a Capital Market Do ?
Let us begin with the stockholder and let us examine him
in his pure form by assuming complete separation between owner-
ship and control in the large corporation. Complete separation
means two things. First, that stockholders do not manage
not even by voting at the stockholders' meeting, which most of
them never attend anyway. Second, that management does not
own stock. But if he neither votes at the stockholders' meet-
ing nor manages the corporation, what does a stockholder do?
The answer is that he votes in a more significant way by making
up his mind to keep, buy, or sell stock. He keeps or buys
stock that looks promising to him. Ke sells stock that no
5longer does. As a first approximation he could be said to
optimize the composition of his stock portfolio by maximizing
the present worth, as he sees it, of future profits bills
the ultimate source of his future dividends and capital gains.

- 39 -
The present worth, as he sees it, of future profits bills
is a subjective judgment unique to the individual stockholder.
But in the U. S. on the basis of such subjective judgments
31 million stockholders' minds are made up daily to keep, buy,
or sell stock. The resulting stock-market prices are objective
and observable enough and represent the terms on which new
equity capital can be raised by stock issuing.
A bondholder or other lender will judge the firm's credit
worthiness by the present worth, as he sees it, of the firm's
future profits bills. Their subjective judgments will decide
the terms on which new borrowed capital can be raised.
Even a firm trying to depend on neither stock issuing
nor borrowed capital, depending instead on its own retained
profits, must try to maximize the present worth of its
future profits bills. Paradoxically, then, in trying to stay
clear of capital-market discipline the firm must behave in the
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very way that discipline would have forced it to behave!
One way or the other, directly or indirectly, then,
management is subject to capital-market discipline. Subject
to such discipline, management must try to develop, produce,
and sell products promising the most rapidly growing future
profits. In an ideal capital market all ideas to do so will
be scrutinized, and scrutiny means interindustry comparisons
of profitability. As a result, by facilitating the entry
of capital into more profitable industries and by denying
capital to less profitable ones, an ideal capital market
would equalize rates of return among industries.
As we know, the actual capital market falls short of
this ideal.
First, in the trial-and-error game of developing,
producing and selling products, some trials reach particular-
ly far into a future shrouded in uncertainty. Prospecting
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for oil and natural gas or searching for new pharmaceuticals
may be very time-consuming, and there is always the risk that
what is being looked for isn't there! Industries specializing
in such trials may attract little entry.
At the very least, if such industries are to be entered
they may have to be entered on a large scale or not at all.
The reason is a peculiar trade-off between risk and scale.
Think of an industrial research project as one trial of a
game which the firm plays against nature with the probability
q of winning. Assume the occurrence of success in one trial
not to affect the probability of success in any other trial.
Let n be the number of research trials undertaken at the same
time and r the number of such trials resulting in success.
As a simple illustration set q = 1/2, r = 0, and n = 1 through
6, thus finding the probability that none of the research
trials results in success or in the businessman's terms
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the probability that the entire capital invested in research
in all trials is lost. That probability declines dramatically
as n rises from 1 to 6 : For the small firm, which can afford
only one trial, the probability is 1/2. For the large firm,
which can afford six simultaneous trials, the probability is
merely 1/64, Brems O], 280.
To facilitate the financing of large scale, especially
capital-intensive large scale, is the purpose of the corporate
form. That the form was needed is apparent from the fact that
in U. S. manufacturing, the largest 200 corporations account
for merely 43% of value added but for 61% of total assets,
cf. our Appendix I. But the corporate form notwithstanding
-
large-scale entry remains more difficult than small-scale
entry, and even with the trade-off between risk and scale,
then, the industries described may attract little entry. As
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Hall and Weiss [25] have found, large firms may systematically
earn a higher rate of return than small ones.
Second, there are the familiar barriers to entry raised
by economies of scale in production or selling: Indivisibi.l 5
of physical production equipment may force an antrant to
either enter on a large scale or not at all. This barrier is
important in the automobile or flat glass industries. Or
high consumer preference for leading brands may force entrants
to either overcome such preference by high and sustained
costs of promotion of their own or to reconcile themselves
to a lower selling price. This barrier is important in the
cigarette and pharmaceuticals industries.
Third, there are the equally familiar legal barriers to
entry. Patent protection may force entrants to obtain licer-je
or engage in time-consuming and at worst futile research of
their own. This barrier is important in the chemical, electric-
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al equipment, and the pharmaceutical industries. Another
legal barrier may be ownership of superior mineral deposits
by existing firms forcing entrants to exploit inferior ones
or engage in time-consuming and at worst futile exploration
of their own. This barrier is important in the aluminum,
nickel, and sulphur industries.
For these three reasons, and several others, the capital
market falls short of its ideal and fails to equalize rates
of return among industries. How far does it fall short?
As an illustration let me use the Fortune Directory
of the largest 500 U. S. industrial corporations for 1973
[23]. Here the rate of return on stockholders 3 equity is
defined as the ratio between net income after interest and
after tax, on the one hand, and equity on the other. Equity,
in turn, is defined as assets minus debt, and assets are
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Figure 5* Variation of Return among Industries.
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defined as year-end assets after depreciation and depletion.
The rate of return thus defined is the one which entry and
exit would tend to equalize among industries [25], 321. In
this sense the definition is the "theoretically correct"
one. It was also the definition used by Dahmen [10], I, 91
and II, 37-61.
Figure 5 shows industry medians for 24 industries. The
highest rates of return are roughly twice the lowest ones.
The highest rates are 0.181 and 0.161 for pharmaceuticals
and mining, respectively our two illustrations of part-
icularly risky trial-and-error games. The lowest rates are
0.082 and 0.093 for textiles and metal manufacturing, respect
ively less risky industries with less scope for break-
throughs .
So much for the capitalist way of allocating capital
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among industries. It has nothing sacred to it and may not
be compatible with what one personally considers "just".
There are other ways of doing the job, e. g., by an author-
itarian bureaucracy or by a democratic one. Historically,
however, the capitalist way unlike alternative ways
has generated the kind of high-wage economy which has
attracted large numbers of immigrants to it. Examples are
the U. S. in the half-century preceding the restriction of
immigration in 1924, and the Federal Republic of Germany
in the quarter-century following the currency reform of
1948.
Would a wage earners' investment fund interfere with
the vitals of the capitalist way of allocating capital
among industries? Perhaps not, but three points are worth
examining.
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3 • First Point : Narrower Opportunity for Self- Financing
It has often been observed that capital raised by issuing
stock, by borrowing s and by self-financing carry different price
tags, hence are not perfect substitutes to the firm. To be mark-
etable, stock must offer a prospect of dividends and capital
gain. To the firm, then, offering such a prospect is the price
to be paid for capital raised by issuing stock. Interest is
the price to be paid for borrowed capital. Neither price has to
be paid for self-financing, hence the firm's preference for the
latter. The riskier the investment project considered, the
stronger the preference.
That capital raised by issuing stock, by borrowing, and by
self-financing carry different price tags becomes significant
under a wage earners' investment fund to which the firm
must contribute in the form of corporate stock.
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To be true, no cash is being contributed, so the cash equival-
ent of the contribution is still available for financing in
accordance with Gleitze's [24] leading idea. But the contrib-
ution has generated new stock. Perhaps it would help to
visualize the contribution as follows: The firm would first
contribute cash to the fund, then issue new stock and sell it
to the fund in order to recover the lost cash. The firm ends
up with the cash and the fund with stock, as they should, but
it has become more transparent that a wage earners' investment
fund simply forces the firm to give up some of its self-financ-
ging and to resort to issuing stock .
Such a substitution of stock issuing for self-financing
could be looked at from two different angles. First, one mig
deplore it: If it is true that the riskier the investment
project considered, the stronger is the firm's preference
for self-financing, then a wage earners' investment fund will
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induce the firm to substitute less risky for more risky
projects. This could decelerate technological progress.
From another angle the substitution of stock issuing for
self-financing might be welcomed: The substitution will
strengthen capital-market discipline. Funds previously withheld
from the capital-market test would now be forced to submit
themselves to it. Stock must ultimately find a stockholder
willing to hold it. It will do so only if it offers him a
prospect of dividends and capital gain. Should he sell it,
its market value would suffer, jeopardizing the marketability/
of future stock issues by the same firm.
But would a wage earners* investment fund really be like
any other stockholder unwilling to hold stock not offering a
prospect of dividends and capital gain? Is the fund always
on the lookout for high-return stock, always trying to get
rid of low-return stock? This carries us to our second
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point.
4. Second Point : Motivation of a Wage Earners' Investment
Fund
Under pure capitalism a stockholder was said to optimize
the composition of his stock portfolio by maximizing the pres-
ent worth, as he sees it, of future profits bills the ul-
timate source of his future dividends and capital gains.
Would a wage earners ' investment fund be similarly motivated?
In principle it might well be. Existing and proposed
wage earners 1 investment funds are entitled to buy and sell
stock as they see fit. Indeed, sometimes maximization of
present worth is prescribed. The Danish union proposal,
Landsorganisationen [30], Sec. Ih , as well as the Danish bill,
Arbe jdsministeriet [1], Sec. 22, specifically demanded an
"active" placement of the fund and defined "active" as
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guaranteeing, first, a share of the capital gains of the
economy and, second, a maximum dividend. Even when not
prescribed, present-worth maximization may be likely, especially
if a number of competing, decentralized funds were set up among
which the individual wage earner would be free to choose as
he would according to the German coalition government proposal
[21].
The fund as a present-worth maximizer would be selling
stock and buying other stock. This would be true under profit
sharing as well as under an investment wage. But the latter
generates a special need for such selling and buying, rooted
in an inherent anomaly of the investment wage.
Under an investment wage, contributions are in proport-
ion to the wage bill. Consequently, less capital-intensive
firms with less investment need will contribute propose-
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ionately more than capital-intensive ones with more in-
vestment need. Present -worth maximization would require the
fund to buy stock in more capital-intensive firms and sell
stock in less capital-intensive ones.
Such a buying-and-selling job might well be a big one,
for capital intensity differs very significantly among in-
9dustries. As an illustration, I use once again the Fortune
Directory of the largest 500 U. S. industrial corporations.
Figure 6 shows industry median assets per employee for 24
industries. The most capital-intensive industry, i. e.,
petroleum refining, has more than eleven times as large
assets per employee as the least capital-intensive one,
i. e . , apparel.
We conclude that the job of shifting funds away from
less capital-intensive firms into more capital-intensive
ones will require a large volume of transactions not
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to mention the additional jobs of shifting funds away from
less rapidly growing and less well-managed firms.
Would the fund be allowed to do its job? The employees
of less capital-intensive, less rapidly growing, or less
well-managed firms would be the very ones whose employment
would be most vulnerable. To such employees the exercise
of their co-determination rights might well look like a
last defense -to be taken away from them if the fund sells
"their" stock! They would no doubt demand a hearing, and
such a hearing was indeed suggested in an official comment
to the Danish bill, Arbe jdsministeriet [1], 22. Hearing or
no hearing, a conflict remains between the interests of the
wage earner qua owner of the investment fund and qua holder
of a particular job. Or, ultimately, a conflict remains
between the two purposes of a wage earners' investment fund:
Giving labor a share of, first, the capital gains, and, second,

- 56 -
the co-determination rights inherent in stock ownership.
Such a conflict could play havoc with our presumption of
identical motivation of the stockholder and the wage
earners' investment fund. The conflict might keep less
capital-intensive, less rapidly growing, and less well
-managed firms alive at the expense of more capital-intensive,
more rapidly growing, and better-managed firms. Such
a possibility looms larger when we consider the size of a
wage earners' investment fund.
5 * Th ir d Point : A Large Fish in a Small Pond
Even apart from the conflict just mentioned, a wage
earners' investment fund still wouldn't be just another
stockholder. Its sheer size would make it unique among
stockholders. To be true, funds of a realistic order of
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magnitude would probably [6], [7], or [8] account for 10% or
less of the total physical capital stock of the economy. But
our Appendix I shows that in the U. S. as well as in Germany
and Sweden, corporation finance relies much more on self
-financing and borrowing than on issuing stock. As a result,
stock markets are small, and in such markets a wage earners'
investment fund could easily be a large fish in a small pond:
The Danish bill [1] anticipated a single central fund owning
35% of all Danish corporate stock by 1986. A parallel to
such disproportionate size was noticed in the Swedish commission
report proposing purchase of corporate stock by the general
pensions fund [38], 73, 80-81.
A mistaken judgment by a very large fund, whether a wage
earners' investment fund or a general pensions fund, will always
be a whopping mistake with nothing to cancel it. By contrast,
in a decentralized market,
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price formation is the outcome of a vast number of individual
judgments. The number of mistakes would also be vast, but the
very vastness means that most of them would cancel.
6
. Mjcroeconomic Conclusions
A general conclusion is that the capital market isn't
just there for the sake of the capitalists. It represents
a complex mechanism with profound effects upon the rest of
the economy. Historically that mechanism has helped generat-
ing such high-wage economies as the U. S., the German Federal
Republic, and Sweden. A wage earners' investment fund could
tamper with that mechanism in at least three conceivable ways.
First, and least important 3 a wage earners' investment fund
would narrow the opportunities for self-financing. Second,
because of its less clear-cut motivation, the fund might keep
less capital-intensive, less rapidly growing, and less well
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-managed firms alive at the expense of more capital-intensive,
more rapidly growing, and better-managed firms. Such malalloc-
ation of resources would be more likely under an investment
wage than under profit sharing. Third, in any event a central'
ized fund would be a large fish in a small pond, and its mis-
takes would consequently be whopping mistakes with nothing to
cancel them.
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APPENDIX I
THE CORPORATION AND THE STOCK CERTIFICATE IN THE ECONOMY
1. The Corporation
The large corporation looms very large in a modern
capitalist economy. In U. S. manufacturing in 1971, the
200 largest corporations accounted for 43% of total value
added but held 61% of total assets [41], 483. Thus they
loom particularly large in capital-intensive industries.
2. The Stock Certificate
In view of the preponderance of the large corporat-
ion, the modest numerical significance of its life nerve,
the stock certificate, may seem surprising.
The significance of the stock certificate may be
measured in two different dimensions.
First, the asset-liability dimension. On corporate
stock as a household asset we have comparable data for the
U. S. [41], 441, and the Federal Republic of Germany [14],
28. For the two countries in 1971 corporate stock at current
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market value constituted 37% and 10%, respectively of financirl
assets of households. In this sense the U. S. household is
three-and-a-half times as willing to supply risk capital as is
the German household.
On corporate stock as a liability of firms, U. S. Federal
Reserve System data [41], 440, are silent. But for the Ger-nan
Federal Republic [14], 29, in 1971 corporate stock at issue
value constituted 13% of the liabilities of nonfinancial
,
nonresidential firms, whether corporations or not. Corporate
stock at current market value would be a far larger percentage,
i. e. , 29%.
Second, the uses-and-sources-of-funds dimension. Stock
issue is an external source of funds, financing long-term in-
vestment. U. S., German, and Swedish data permit us to measure
stock issue as a per cent of gross investment in physical
assets
.
U. S. data [41], 475, apply to nonfarm, nonfinancial
corporations and show an average of 7% for 1967-71.
German data are twofold. First, the flow-of-funds account
[12], 22 and [13], 28, of the German Federal Bank defines stoc :
.-
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issue narrowly as merely shares in Aktiengesellschaften . Its
data apply to all nonfinancial , nonresidential firms, whether
corporations or not, and show an average of 3% for 1967-71.
Second, in its annual report on the balance sheets of firms
[15], 39, [16], 29, and [17], 31, the German Federal Bank
defines stock issue widely as shares in both Aktiengesellschaf -
ten and Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung . Here, the
data apply to nonfarm, nonfinancial , nongovernment, and
non-personal-service firms, whether corporations or not, and
show an average of 7% for 1967-71 same as the U. S. for the
same period.
Swedish data as used by Eliasson [20], 31 and Kjellman-
Nordling [28], 11, apply to manufacturing firms with more than
50 employees excluding electric-power generation and show an
average of 6% for 1956-70. Swedish data as used by an in-depth
study by Lowenthal [32], 115, 122-124, 128-129, and 132-140,
applied to an overlapping group, i. e., corporations with more
than 50 employees including electric-power generation. This
group showed an average of 12% for 1955-62.
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APPENDIX II
A MINI GERMAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY
More must have been written in German on wage earners 5
investment funds than in any other language. The reader may
find the following mini dictionary helpful:
Die Anteilscheine = Fund certificates
Die Beteiligungsquote = Contribution fraction
Die Ertragsbeteiligung = Frofit Sharing
Der Fonds = Wage earners' investment fund
Die Gewinnbeteiligung E Profit Sharing
Der Investivlohn = Investment wage
Die Sperrfrist = Redemption period
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FOOTNOTES
For more detailed accounts, see Robinson [37] and The Economist.
Intelligence Unit [39]. For a mini German-English dictionary,
see Appendix II.
2Bhatia [33 found a marginal propensity to consume capital gains
of 0.06, less than one-tenth of a marginal propensity to consume
income of 0.70 to 0.80.
3 Forsyth [22], 65 is mistaken in thinking that only oligopol-
istic market structures permit shifting of the investment wage
to the price of goods.
4
as is being done in the otherwise quite inquisitive German
theoretical literature. Here, a negative effect on the propel
ity to save national output is universally predicted. But the.
prediction is logical enough: It simply follows from always
assuming a zero redemption period, thus ignoring fv.nd generation,
see Jaeger [25], Krelle , Schunck , and Siebke [29], 52-8C, Kuckl
[35], and Ramser [36], Is net redistribution of wealth with
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a zero redemption period a bit like Hamlet without the prince?
Fund generation was ignored by neither Forsyth nor the
Danish Council of Economic Advisers. Forsyth merely expected
it to prevent a drop but never mentioned a rise in the propens
ity to save national output, [22], 66 and 72. The Danish
Council did expect fund generation to raise substantially
the propensity to save national output, [113, 43, 49.
5
as the present writer has done in a two-industry steady-state
growth model of full resource allocation, [5], Ch. 8.
Data used from the Fortune Directory by special permission,
copyright Time, Inc.
7
E. g., Duesenberry [19], Chs. 4-5, Krelle, Schunck, and Siebke
[29], 196-201, Lowenthal [32], 19-28, and [38], 72. For critic-
ism of the observation, see Modigliani-Miller [34], and Eliasson
[20], 48-52.

- 66 -
g Strictly speaking, therefore, it is misleading to imply that
the firm's liquidity remains unaffected by contributions ir.
the form of corporate stock, as Gleitze [24], Bergstrom [2],
62, and Forsyth [22], 73, are doing. To be true, Bergstrom 's
redemption period is infinite, but he does think of his wage
earners' investment fund as a return maximizer. Consequently
the fund will not hold the contributed stock unless dividends
and capital gains can be expected on it.
g Data used from the Fortune Directory by special permission,
copyright Time, Inc.
The shareholders of a G. m. b . H . enjoy the same limited
liability to creditors as do shareholders of an A . G . But
the stock of a G. m. b. H . is not as easily transferable
as that of an A . G . , and the minimum size of a G . m . b . H .
is smaller than that of an A. G . In German terminology,
G. m. b. H.'s and A. G.'s are called "Kapitalgesellschafter'
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